

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 DODE-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00
H-01 ISO-00 /060 R

DRAFTED BY OSD/ISA:HDUNLOP:MHB
APPROVED BY EUR/RPM:EREHFELD
OSD/ISA:GEN. BOWMAN
EUR/RPM:WTSHINN, JR. (DRAFT)
EUR/NE:JSHUMATE

-----170049Z 029936 /55

P 162110Z MAY 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY
INFO USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: NATO, AWACS

SUBJECT: NATO AWACS -- EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
-- SECDEF AND UK AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.

1. QUOTED BELOW IS A RECENT UNCLASSIFIED EXCHANGE OF
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN AND
UK AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. RAMSBOTHAM ON THE SUBJECT OF NATO
AEW/AWACS. ON APRIL 12, 1977 AMBASSADOR RAMSBOTHAM NOTIFIED
SECRETARY BROWN THAT HE HAD SENT TO THE SENATE AND
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES A MEMORANDUM SETTING
FORTH THE RATIONALE FOR THE MARCH 31 UK DECISION TO
ACQUIRE THE NIMROD INSTEAD OF PARTICIPATING IN A NATO
PURCHASE OF THE E-3A AWACS AEW SYSTEM. WE WERE NEITHER
CONSULTED NOR INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY THE BRITISH ABOUT
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THEIR INITIATIVE WITH THE CONGRESS, NOR DO WE AGREE WITH
THE BRITISH VERSION OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE UK
DECISION ON NIMROD. TO KEEP THE RECORD STRAIGHT,
SECRETARY BROWN RESPONDED TO AMBASSADOR RAMSBOTHAM ON
MAY 10, FORWARDING COPIES TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE
AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES.

2. FOR LONDON: PLEASE BRING THIS EXCHANGE OF CORRES-
PONDENCE TO THE ATTENTION OF APPROPRIATE UK OFFICIALS.

3. FOR ALL: PLEASE REPORT IF ANY SIMILAR BRITISH EFFORTS IN OTHER NATO CAPITALS HAVE COME TO YOUR ATTENTION. YOU MAY OF COURSE DRAW ON SECRETARY BROWN'S RESPONSE IF THE SUBJECT SHOULD ARISE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

QUOTE MAY 10, 1977

HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
SIR PETER RAMSBOTHAM, G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.
BRITISH AMBASSADOR
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

DEAR PETER,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 12, WHICH FORWARDED A COPY OF THE NOTE YOU SENT TO MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES REGARDING HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO ACQUIRE THE NIMROD EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT.

I AM PLEASED TO LEARN THAT THE BRITISH ACTION IN FAVOR OF NIMROD IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED KINGDOM ATTACHES TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ARMS PROCUREMENT AND STANDARDIZATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AS
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YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE CONTINUING EFFORTS IN THIS AREA TO BE AN URGENT ALLIANCE PRIORITY. WE ALSO WELCOME ASSURANCES THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF AN ALLIANCE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND IS ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF THE INTER-OPERABILITY OF NIMROD WITH AWACS ON A PRIORITY BASIS.

NEVERTHELESS, YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE BRITISH DECISION. YOUR NOTE TO THE CONGRESS DESCRIBES THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE MARCH 25 SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MEETING IN BRUSSELS AND POINTS OUT THE STAUNCH SUPPORT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN THE CONCEPT OF A SINGLE ALLIANCE AEW SYSTEM BASED ON AWACS. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, SHARE YOUR CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MARCH 25 MEETING AS ONE AT WHICH MINISTERIAL CONSENSUS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED NOR A FIRM TIME TABLE SET FOR GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO ASSURE INITIAL FUNDING THIS YEAR. IN FACT, AT THAT MEETING MINISTERS GAVE UNANIMOUS SUPPORT TO THE

UNIFIED ALLIANCE AWACS PROGRAM AND PERSONALLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THEIR GOVERNMENTS' APPROVAL BY JULY 1 OF THIS YEAR. I BELIEVE THIS WAS A REASONABLE OBJECTIVE WHICH WE COULD HAVE

ACHIEVED.

I ALSO NOTE THAT, IN DEALING WITH THE FUNDING ISSUE, YOU ASSERT THAT, ON MARCH 25 LAST, 20 PERCENT OF THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION REMAINED TO BE UNDERWRITTEN. NO MATTER HOW ONE CALCULATES THE COMPLEX FUNDING ISSUE, SURELY NO SHORTFALL REMAINED WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, ESPECIALLY AS EVERY MINISTER PRESENT STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN PROCUREMENT FUNDING.

A FURTHER OBSERVATION REGARDING THE URGENCY OF A DECISION ON A REPLACEMENT FOR THE BRITISH SHACKLETON AIRCRAFT
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"IN THE VERY EARLY 1980'S," THE MAIN POINT STRESSED IN THE MEMORANDUM. AS I TOLD MINISTER MULLEY, IT SEEMED TO ME HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THE ALLIANCE E-3A (AWACS) SYSTEM WOULD BE OPERATIONAL BY THE TIME THE SHACKLETONS LEFT SERVICE, AND THAT CERTAINLY PROVISION COULD BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT THE FIRST ALLIANCE AIRCRAFT WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO FILL THE GAP CREATED BY THE DEPARTING SHACKLETONS. I FURTHER TOLD MINISTER MULLEY THAT, IF FOR SOME REASON THE ALLIANCE AWACS WOULD NOT BE ON STATION WHEN THE SHACKLETONS WERE WITHDRAWN, I FELT CERTAIN THAT PROVISION OF U.S. NATIONAL AWACS COULD BE ARRANGED TO MEET UK NEEDS UNTIL THE GAP COULD BE CLOSED BY ALLIANCE AWACS COVERAGE. SO I DO NOT THINK THAT THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT THAT THE SHACKLETON REPLACEMENT ISSUE, IMPORTANT THOUGH IT UNDOUBTEDLY IS, SHOULD HAVE GOVERNED THE DECISION NOT TO PROCEED WITH A SINGLE ALLIANCE AWACS FORCE.

I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST TURN OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURING A VIABLE ALLIANCE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY, EVEN IF, AS NOW APPEARS NECESSARY, IT IS BASED ON A MIXED FORCE OF NIMROD AND AWACS. I HAVE WRITTEN MINISTERS MULLEY AND LEBER REQUESTING THEIR VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE NEED TO ADOPT A REVISED PROGRAM BY THE END OF THIS YEAR IF E-3A PRODUCTION LINE CONTINUITY IS TO BE ASSURED. OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE WILL BE TO ENSURE THE INTEROPERABILITY OF NIMROD WITH AWACS, AND YOUR GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THIS ARE THEREFORE NEEDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I AM, FOR THE RECORD, FORWARDING A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES.

SINCERELY,

/S/ HAROLD

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HAROLD BROWN END QUOTE

QUOTE APRIL 12, 1977

THE HONOURABLE
HAROLD BROWN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
PENTAGON

DEAR HAROLD

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING

FRED MULLEY SENT YOU A MESSAGE ON 30 MARCH EXPLAINING THE REASONS THAT HAD PROMPTED HIM, RELUCTANTLY, TO RECOMMEND TO HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM SHOULD NOW GO AHEAD WITH NIMROD. MAY I ADD MY OWN APPRECIATION FOR THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH YOU HAVE SHOWN OVER THIS DIFFICULT DECISION.

I THOUGHT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW THAT I AM SENDING A NOTE TO SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, EXPLAINING THE BACKGROUND TO OUR DECISION IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS AS IT HAD ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED TO YOU. I AM ALSO ARRANGING FOR COPIES OF THIS NOTE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. I ENCLOSE A COPY.

THERE WILL, INEVITABLY, BE DISAPPOINTMENT ON THE HILL OVER OUR DECISION AND I WANT TO BE SURE THAT CONGRESS APPRECIATES, AS CLEARLY AS YOU DO, THE OVERRIDING REASONS WHICH FORCED US TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE NIMROD DEVELOPMENT AND THE FACT THAT THIS DECISION IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE IMPORTANCE WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ARMS PROCUREMENT AND STANDARDISATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. I BELIEVE THAT, ONCE THE BACKGROUND HAS
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BEEN EXPLAINED TO THEM, CONGRESS WILL ALSO ACCEPT THAT WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO PROCEED AS WE DID.

YOURS SINCERELY

/S/ PETER RAMSBOTHAM
(PETER RAMSBOTHAM)
H M AMBASSADOR

(ATTACHMENT)

S - WHY NIMROD AEW? THE UK POINT OF VIEW

THE UK IS ALREADY OPERATING AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING (AEW) AIRCRAFT AS PART OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO NATO AND IS THE ONLY EUROPEAN COUNTRY SO DOING. THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED ARE THE SHACKLETON AEWS WHICH OPERATE IN THE NATO EASTERN ATLANTIC AND CHANNEL AREAS, AS WELL AS THE UK DEFENCE REGION. THE SHACKLETON IS A 4-PISTON-ENGINED PROPELLOR AIRCRAFT WHICH FIRST FLEW IN 1952 AND SUBSEQUENTLY 60 AIRCRAFT WERE BUILT AND USED IN A MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE ROLE. TWELVE OF THESE AGEING AIRCRAFT WERE CONVERTED TO AN AEW VERSION EARLY IN 1972 BUT IT WAS REALISED AT THE TIME THAT THE AIRCRAFT'S LIFE WAS LIMITED AND THAT REPLACEMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED IN THE VERY EARLY 1980S. BY THEN THE END OF THEIR FATIGUE LIFE WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED AND IT WILL BE TOTALLY UNECONOMIC TO REFURBISH THEM FOR FURTHER SERVICE.

STUDIES ON AEW REPLACEMENT RADAR WERE STARTED IN 1966/7 AND VARIOUS AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT OPTIONS WERE STUDIED FROM 1973. OUT OF THESE STUDIES GREW THE NIMROD AEW CONCEPT. THE NIMROD IS A DERIVATION OF THE COMET MK IV AND IS A 4-JET-ENGINED AIRCRAFT WHICH FIRST ENTERED RAF SERVICE IN 1969 EQUIPPED FOR THE ANTI-SUBMARINE ROLE. IT COMBINES A COMPARATIVELY HIGH TOP-SPEED CRUISE WITH THE CAPABILITY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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OF A LONG LOITER TIME AT LOWER SPEEDS. THE AEW STUDIES DETERMINED THAT THE AIRCRAFT COULD BE SUITABLY MODIFIED TO CARRY ALL THE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THE NEW ROLE.

ANOTHER OPTION STUDIED WAS THE AWACS BOEING E3A AIRCRAFT. THE US FIRST INTRODUCED THE CONCEPT OF AWACS AS A NATO PROJECT AT COMMITTEE LEVEL IN NATO LATE IN 1973. THE UK GAVE FULL WEIGHT TO IT AS A MEANS OF MEETING HER NEEDS AND, AFTER CONTINUING STUDIES, MADE A POLICY DECISION IN MARCH 1975 TO ADOPT AWACS AS PART OF A NATO PROJECT, CONTINGENT UPON IT BEING AVAILABLE IN TIME. THE NECESSARY FUNDS WERE ALSO FIRMLY ALLOCATED. THIS POLICY HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY ADHERED TO EVER SINCE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE

OF THE UNCERTAINTIES OF NATO BEING ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SUCH A LARGE AND COMPLEX PROJECT, UK CONTINUED TO STUDY AND RESEARCH AT A LOW FINANCIAL LEVEL THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NIMROD AEW SYSTEM AS A FALL-BACK FOR THE AGEING SHACKLETON AIRCRAFT.

IN THE FOLLOWING MONTH, APRIL 1975, THE AWACS NATO PROJECT OFFICE (NAPO) WAS SET UP IN BRUSSELS AND INITIATED A CONTRACT DEFINITION STUDY IN OCTOBER 1975, THE RESULTS OF WHICH BECAME AVAILABLE IN MARCH 1976, AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME, PROVIDED A DETAILED COSTED PROJECT PROPOSAL TO NATO. THIS PROPOSAL WAS CONSIDERED BY THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN JUNE 1976 AND THE US AND UK WERE HOPEFUL THAT AN AFFIRMATIVE DECISION WOULD BE REACHED AT THAT MEETING. IN THE EVENT IT WAS NOT BUT, IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THE UK DEFENCE MINISTER, MR. ROY MASON, SPELT OUT THE UK POSITION, NAMELY THAT THE SHACKLETONS MUST BE REPLACED IN THE VERY EARLY 1980S AND THAT THE UK MUST HAVE AN ASSURED REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME. HE HAD NEEDED A DECISION AT THIS MEETING, BUT IN ORDER TO KEEP THE NATO PROJECT ALIVE, HE AGREED TO WAIT UNTIL THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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NEXT DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER 1976, TO GIVE NATIONS ADDITIONAL TIME TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS AND COME TO AN AGREEMENT. IF NO DECISION WERE REACHED IN DECEMBER, HE WARNED THAT UK WOULD RELUCTANTLY HAVE TO CHOOSE THE NIMROD AEW SOLUTION.

AGREEMENT WAS STILL NOT REACHED IN DECEMBER AND THE NEW UK MINISTER OF DEFENCE, MR. FRED MULLEY, AGAIN TRYING TO SAVE THE PROJECT, EXTENDED THE DATE TO MARCH 1977, BUT STATED THAT THIS TIME THE UK COULD AFFORD TO WAIT NO LONGER. NEVERTHELESS, IF AGREEMENT WERE ACHIEVED HE WAS STILL PREPARED TO FOREGO THE NATIONAL PROJECT IN FAVOUR OF THE NATO PROJECT.

ALL THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED AT THE MARCH 1977 DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING WAS SUPPORT BY SEVERAL BUT NOT ALL OF THE NATO DEFENCE MINISTERS, AND THIS SUPPORT WAS SUBJECT TO REFERENCE BACK FOR ENDORSEMENT BY THEIR RESPECTIVE PARLIAMENTS. IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF MINISTERS INDICATED THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION FOR WHICH THEY UOULD HOPE TO OBTAIN PARLIAMENTARY ENDORSEMENT, 20 PERCENT OF THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION REMAINED TO BE UNDERWRITTEN. NOT ONLY WAS NO NATIONALLY ENDORSED AGREEMENT ACHIEVED, BUT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT TO A TIMESCALE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UK HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO PROCEED INTO FULL DEVELOPMENT WITH, AND THUS COMMIT THEMSELVES TO, THE NIMROD AEW. THIS CHOICE WAS MADE WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE

AND DISAPPOINTMENT IN VIEW OF THE BROADER POLITICAL AND MILITARY ADVANTAGES ATTACHING TO THE NATO PROJECT.

HOWEVER, IN ANNOUNCING THE DECISION, THE UK MINISTER OF DEFENCE POINTED OUT THAT IT CAN NOW BE ASSURED THAT THE EASTERN ATLANTIC AND CHANNEL AREAS OF NATO AS WELL AS THE

UK DEFENCE REGION WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY AEW COVERAGE.
HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR A
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MIXED FORCE WITH NIMROD AEW OPERATING, AS IT IS DESIGNED
TO DO, OVER THE SEA AREAS OF THE EASTERN ATLANTIC AND
CHANNEL AND AWACS OPERATING OVER THE LAND MASSES, AS IT
IS BEST DESIGNED TO DO, OF THE NATO CENTRAL FRONT. SHOULD
NATO AGREE TO PROCEED WITH AN AWACS PROJECT TO COVER THE
CENTRAL FRONT, HE HAS UNDERTAKEN TO MAKE THE NIMROD AEW
COMPATIBLE WITH IT AND INTER-OPERABLE TO THE MAXIMUM
EXTENT.

ALTHOUGH THE UK WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO CONTINUE WITH THE
NATO PROJECT, SHE WAS PREVENTED FROM SO DOING BY THE
ABSOLUTE NEED TO REPLACE SHACKLETON AIRCRAFT BY THE VERY
EARLY 1980S. HAD FIRM UNDERTAKINGS BEEN FORTHCOMING NOW,
IN PARTICULAR FROM THE FRG AS THE THIRD MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR
ALONG WITH THE USA AND THE UK TO THE AWACS PROJECT,
THE UK, AS THE DEFENCE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR, WOULD HAVE
CONTINUED TO SUPPORT AWACS. BUT THE INABILITY OF OUR
EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO MAKE SUCH COMMITMENTS MADE THE UK'S
DECISION IN FAVOUR OF THE NIMROD AEW INEVITABLE.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS DECISION DO NOT IN ANY WAY
DIMINISH THE UK COMMITMENT, IN COMMON WITH THE USA AND
OTHER NATO ALLIES; TOWARDS IMPROVING THE OVERALL MILITARY
CAPABILITY OF NATO BY INCREASED COOPERATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF FUTURE MAJOR MILITARY
SYSTEMS; AND THE INTER-OPERABILITY OF NATIONALLY
DEVELOPED PROJECTS. THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF NATO IS TO MAKE
THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND RATIONAL USE OF ITS RESOURCES.

A COPY OF MR. MULLEY'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO PARLIAMENT OF THE
NIMROD AEW CHOICE IS ATTACHED. END QUOTE

(ATTACHMENT)

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ON AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 31 MARCH 1977 BY THE SECRETARY OF
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STATE FOR DEFENCE, MR. FRED MULLEY

QUOTE: WITH PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, I WISH TO MAKE A
STATEMENT ABOUT AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT.

FOLLOWING THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 25 MARCH, THE

GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THEIR POSITION ON THE PROVISION OF THESE AIRCRAFT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE. AS I MADE CLEAR AT THE MEETING, WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO TWO POSTPONEMENTS OF THE NATO DECISION WHICH IS URGENTLY REQUIRED IF TIMELY PROVISION OF AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING COVER FOR THE NATO AREA IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

AS THE HOUSE KNOWS, WE HAVE MAINTAINED AN ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BASED ON THE NIMROD AIRCRAFT AS A FALLBACK OPTION IN CASE OF FAILURE BY NATO TO AGREE ON A SYSTEM FOR THE WHOLE ALLIANCE. THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS SO FAR BEEN FUNDED AT A LOW LEVEL, BUT IF IT IS NOT TO BE DELAYED FURTHER A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE RATE OF EXPENDITURE ON IT IS NOW NECESSARY. IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE PROCUREMENT OF THE AWACS SYSTEM BY NATO, WE HAVE DECIDED THAT WE MUST NOW GO AHEAD WITH THE NIMROD SYSTEM, WHICH, SUBJECT TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, WILL NOT PROCEED TO FULL DEVELOPMENT.

IN TAKING THIS DECISION, THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TAKEN FULL ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN NATO FOR FURTHER DELAY TO ENABLE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS ON THE PROCUREMENT OF THE BOEING E3A AWACS AIRCRAFT TO BE FURTHER STUDIED. OUR DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH NIMROD, HOWEVER, WILL GIVE THE ALLIANCE AN URGENTLY NEEDED AND MODERN AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY TO REPLACE THE SHACKLETONS NOW OPERATING IN THE UK AIR DEFENCE REGION AND IN THE EASTERN ATLANTIC AND CHANNEL AREAS. OUR DECISION DOES NOT EXCLUDE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THE POSSIBILITY OF A COLLECTIVE NATO SOLUTION TO THE REQUIREMENT. IN DEVELOPING THE NIMROD SYSTEM WE SHALL AIM TO SECURE THE MAXIMUM INTER-OPERABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN NIMROD AND WHATEVER ADDITIONAL AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT THE ALLIANCE MAY EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO PROCURE. I SUGGESTED TO MY NATO COLLEAGUES THAT A SINGLE NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING FORCE, THOUGH IT WOULD BE AN IDEAL SOLUTION, IS NOT THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING REQUIREMENT COULD BE MET. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL SECURE MAXIMUM MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS FROM THE RESOURCES WHICH THE ALLIANCE EVENTUALLY DECIDES TO DEVOTE TO THE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING TASK. END QUOTE.

CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY PROCUREMENT, AIR DEFENSE, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, WARNING SYSTEMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 16-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE112063
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: OSD/ISA:HDUNLOP:MHB
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770173-1115
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197705110/baaaevyg.tel
Line Count: 432
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: c26ae888-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2345792
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO AWACS -- EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN -- SECDEF AND UK AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.
TAGS: MASS, UK, US, NATO, (BROWN, HAROLD), (RAMSBOTHAM, PETER)
To: ALL NATO CAPITALS INFO USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/c26ae888-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009